While quite aware of the unpleasant sentiments that the term "fear" may evoke in many, I beckon the reader to bear with me until I have explained my meaning. The purpose of this section is to show that unnoticed fears against the pursuit of a generally acceptable scientific paradigm do exist within the academe and that, while there are valid bases in the background of such fears, the fears themselves are not justified.
This exposition may be seen by some as 'psychologizing' the current practice of the science of education. Any call for change (which this work tries to be), unavoidably, brings along a 'psychological' undertone because it involves pointing out things that need to be changed and, since these changes are aimed at a human community (not the least a scientific community), the problematique entails some degree of 'psychologizing'. It should be noted, however, that this feature pertains only to observations that have motivated my embarking on this task, not the entire reasoning of this treatise.
2.1.1. The Presence of Fears against the Natural Scientific Epistemology
In Section1.3. it was pointed out that "evading focus on a generally acceptable paradigm based on educational universals appears to be the result of some elusive form of fear". Does such a fear exist? First, it must be emphasized that not necessarily universals themselves are feared (although there is a tendency to avoid them, as shown in Section 1.4.); it is the idea of making use of natural scientific epistemological approaches -- and thus, methods -- that may be feared. As discussed in Section 1.2., this approach can easily be confused with a purely positivistic method. This confusion, on the other hand, may give reason for such fears: rigid positivism has lead to so many scientific impasses and has proved so inadequate an approach that it is justifiably rejected. Thus, the target of potential fears may the possibility of degenerating towards positivism by endorsing the epistemological approach of natural sciences, with the misconception that this approach would characterize positivistic and 'exact' sciences.
How can we ascertain whether such fears actually exist and whether there is such a misconception of epistemological stands? In Chapter1, we concluded that "there is an informal and subtle form of tradition within the science of education" and that "this subtle force is content with isolated educational philosophies, thus inclining towards atomistic dogma". It is reasonable to ask whether subtle tradition and informal dogma are somehow related to the concept of fear. When tradition becomes a subtle or unconscious trait -- that is, when its forms are less articulate and observable -- its effect also becomes more difficult to trace. One form of such tradition is what we call here "informal dogma". This is dogma that is not formalized into an official doctrinal system but which, nonetheless, indoctrinates those under the influence of the particular tradition.
In themselves, these tradition and dogma do not constitute fear. However, it is in the nature of dogma to be highly protective and territorial. The slightest observable threat (whether real or imagined) to the authority of doctrinal orthodoxy is known, throughout history, to have provoked strong defensive reaction on the part of the protagonists of the status quo. This opposition is caused by fear -- in fact, by a variety of possible fears: fear of losing the sense of security inherent in what is known and familiar, fear of getting lost in something unknown or dangerous, fear of re-establishing some old wrong that has been gotten rid of, fear of breaking a well-established and tried-out order of things, etc. In short, fear of insecurity. It is the existence of the abovementioned defensive reaction that is a sign of fear (perhaps unconscious ones).
So, are there defensive reactions against a universalist paradigm of education within scholarly circles? If I had to base the answer on my own experience, it would definitely be a "yes". Caution and defensive reactions against a natural scientific epistemology do seem to exist within the field of education, and indeed within human sciences in general. And since, based on the foregoing discussion, such reactions are symptoms of fear, it follows that fears against a natural scientific epistemology exist. Now, it must be emphasized here that the existence of fear tells nothing about its validity; a fear can be well justified and based on valid reasons or it can be false and based on ignorance or prejudice. Moreover, quite obviously, the more unconscious a fear is the more it is likely to be based on lack of knowledge. It will be the aim of Section 2.1.4. to evaluate the validity and bases of these fears.
By "defensive reactions", I do not mean any systematic front against a natural scientific epistemology -- there is no need for it since neither is there a systematic front (or any front at all) in favour of it. What I mean by opposition is that attempts to formulate generic or universal statements about education or about human reality and to study them within a natural scientific epistemological stand, more often than not, provoke an articulate displeasure or annoyance among a great number of scholars. This is also seen in the tendency of various educationalists to be overcautious as not to make generalizations concerning the reality of human existence, the nature of human society, the goals of education, or the values inculcated through education. Some examples of such caution will be discussed in Sections 2.1.2. and 2.1.3.
2.1.4. The Valid Bases of Fears against
rhe Scientific Study of Universals
While the foregoing discussion focussed attention on certain apprehensions related to human and educational universals, the essential issue is not that universals per se are shunned (as stated in Section 2.1.1.). More importantly and to the point, what is feared are the natural scientific epistemology and the approach it implies for the study of universals. This approach is seen by most as the positivistic method, which in turn has proved so inadequate that it is rightly avoided. What is feared then, and justly so, is falling back into positivism; what is feared along with it -- throwing the baby out with the bathwater, in a manner of speaking -- is the incorrect perception that natural sciences would be essentially positivistic. Moreover, it would not be farfetched to observe that the majority of scholars actually tends to avoid a focus on universals as well.
From the foregoing discussion, it is fair to maintain that most of these apprehensions relate either to (a) scientific credibility or to (b) upholding liberty. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that both scientific credibility and upholding liberty are unarguably valid and also honourable criteria for any honest scholarly stand. The validity of these criteria is not at stake here; rather, what may be questioned is the validity of the supposed threat that a paradigmatic focus on the scientific study of educational universals would pose on keeping with these criteria. Thus, the misgivings arising from such suppositions may be founded either on valid historical experience and critical knowledge, or on traditional prejudice and biased views -- or on a mixture of these.
A broader historical picture needs to be addressed in order to better understand the background of the mentioned twin criteria of scientific credibility and upholding liberty that needs to be addressed. This background is not directly related to the academic world but has its roots in the historical traumas of humankind. Given the millennial experience of humanity with the abuse of social, political and religious authority, it is both understandable and, indeed, justified that there exists a certain dread of totalitarianism, despotism and arbitrary use of spiritual and intellectual leadership.
Particularly, this is true in the case of clerical authority. Religions have historically been the most powerful instrument for producing visions and ideals that give meaning to human life, and at the time of their appearance, world religions were the most progressive force in their contemporary societies. Later, however, they always fell into opportunistic hands of the clergy and their religious institutions, which throughout history have made a crucial disservice to humanity and to the unbiased investigation of truth (often with the full support of secular rulers). By assuming the exclusive right for the understanding and propagation of spiritual and intellectual ideals, they segregated people's lives from high-minded aspirations, thus giving rise to the abhorrent manifestations of religious behaviour, which is summed up in dogmatism and fanaticism.
Such violations against truth and humanity are common knowledge and are in no need of elucidation. It was the enlightened scholars and thinkers of each era -- beginning from the Renaissance up until the opening years of the twentieth century -- that, in their yearning for intellectual and spiritual freedom, sought emancipation from dictated doctrines and pursued critical thinking, objective validity and reliability of knowledge -- in short, unhampered search for truth. Names such as Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Ren Descartes (1596-1650), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Franois Voltaire (1694-1778), David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831), Karl Marx (1818-1883), and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) come readily to mind. While groundbreaking in their pursuit of intellectual emancipation, the legacy of these great thinkers forms no coherent pattern of thought -- it is patchy, at best. Their ideas and propositions started to gather a diverse congregation of followers from different walks of life, but mostly from the intelligentsia. As the nineteenth century drew to an end, new momentum began to gather in the form of social movements that appealed to the masses of people, not only to the advantaged elite. Primarily in Europe and North America, but also elsewhere in the world, diverse and often incompatible views on the nature of society and human reality thrived and nourished, fuelled by the severe conditions under which thousands of less advantaged members of society lived -- members who had, all of a sudden, become aware that they were capable of effecting their own destinies. Simultaneously, the scientific advancement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century seemed to encourage easy assumptions about human nature -- an almost unnoticed overlay that went on in the hurried discussions of society. These unexamined views communicated themselves to ever widening audiences.
Then came the two Wars that, in two successive blows, changed the entire perception of Europeans and, to a lesser degree, peoples of other nations of the world. While devastating tens of millions of lives, the human losses and horrors of two world wars pale in the face of the moral devastation they wreaked. The moral damage caused by any war is often underestimated and buried under the claims of 'victory', 'honour' and 'peace' so noisily voiced in the aftermath. The consequences of wars of the magnitude of these two Wars are incalculable. The ensuing brutalization of the human nature was, perhaps, the worst legacy of these catastrophes, particularly on the European continent. Indeed, by the end of the Second World War, Europe, which still in the first decade of the twentieth century had represented the summit of civilization, had lost this pre-eminent station.
This entire historical process, with its traumatic experiences, has disillusioned the human race of the practical, intellectual and spiritual authority under which people had, traditionally, toiled and lived throughout their lives. Little wonder then, that the protagonists of enlightenment and human progress began to dread all manner of doctrinal orthodoxy, especially those concerning human reality. It is the repercussions of this dread that are manifested in the fear of the scientific study of human (and educational) universals, particularly in the Western world. Elsewhere, the effect is somewhat less dramatic but, since academic tradition is squarely based on a Western influence, this is true for most academic people worldwide.
Let us now return to the original questions: Are the bases of fears against the study of human and educational universals with a realist scientific approach (similar to that of natural sciences) valid or unsound? Does such study constitute a positivistic stand? Does the inclusion of such research in the domain of educational science pose a threat to the twin criteria of scientific credibility and upholding liberty? While the original cause of such doubts, as shown above, is certainly valid and sound, it would be absurd to adhere to the notion that a realist scientific approach to the exploration of human and educational universals, in itself, would diminish scientific credibility or obstruct liberty of thought. In fact, quite the opposite is the case: such a notion imposes an arbitrary limitation on the scope of scientific investigation and thus, itself, becomes an obstruction of the freedom of thought. Thus, the justification of such fears is doubtful because, to most scholars, the basic fear is that the approach of natural sciences would incline human sciences towards positivism. As shown in Section 2.1.1., however, this threat is not intrinsic to the natural scientific approach, nor can natural sciences be any longer considered as positivistic or as 'exact' sciences.
Others may, moreover, say that human and educational universals, while not to be avoided, are not so relevant or interesting to the field of education as they yield no immediate applications and are, thus, of no general benefit. This notion, too, is absurd in two ways: first, to set immediate application and practical benefit as a criterion for the relevance of science would discredit the entire line of basic research and is by no means a generally accepted condition of scientific quest; and second, there has never been a systematic and generally adopted line of scientific exploration of educational universals within the science of education, and therefore, the potential long-term ramifications of such a focus are unknown and its influence on science and application remains unrevealed.
It is such notions that are tantamount to "throwing out the baby out with the bathwater"; they do a great disservice to the evolution of the science of education. I believe that the reason for the existence of such notions is that scholars in the science of education are mostly unaware of their own misgivings -- they either do not realize them or they deny them. Due to this, fears are never properly identified, articulated, and opened up. They remain mostly subconscious, grounded on the traumatic experiences and the heritage of our troubled history. And since these experiences give every reason for great caution, the apprehensions feel highly justified and go unchecked.
2.1.5. The Current Expression of Fears
against the Scientific Study of Universals
Human scientists, including educationalists, are not immune to the misgivings of Western civilization. The deep-rooted dread of giving in to totalitarianism and giving up one's freedom, especially freedom of thought, feeds the academic mentality. As educationalists bring their human fears along into the academic arena and couple them with scientific standards, this dread is reflected in almost dogmatic avoidance of a natural scientific epistemology in the study of human or educational universals and an overwhelming focus instead on educational particulars.
What, then, is the current manifestation and form of these fears? First, due to their informal and unconscious character, they are not easily detected, and are even less easily described as concrete occurrences. Three generally acknowledged and mutually exclusive views on the ontology of universals were discussed in Section 1.2. It is doubtful that any educationalists would seriously entertain a nominalist view of universals. Therefore, at this point of discussion, we shall touch only upon the realist and conceptualist approaches on universals. The realist stand considers universals as objectively real, as objects which have an independent existence, and distinct from physical phenomena or mental activity. The conceptualist position, on the other hand, ascribes universals to the domain of human psyche, considering them as mental tools that produce descriptions of a given domain of reality.
I believe few would have any objection to the conceptualist definition of universals -- especially since it provides only a debatable philosophical interest in universals and has little consequences on the status quo of the science of education. Rather, it seems that the avoidance of educational universals is targeted at their realist interpretation which maintains that, while our understanding (i.e. our approximations) of universals is always conceptualistic, the universals themselves do not need to be confined thus and may well have a realist ontology. The conceptualist interpretation, on the other hand, ascribes less reality to the ontological essence of universals. Thus, if there is a reluctance to approach universals as real objects that could be scientifically approximated, a conceptualist mentality (perhaps a subconscious one) comes in handy: it dilutes the realness of universals and makes them scientifically uninteresting or at least unresearcheable.
Thus, the fear of making use of the natural scientific approach in the study of educational universals is not seen in the denial of these universals, but in ignoring, with a subtle conceptualist frame of mind, the possibility of their realist interpretation. Since, however, universals have never been systematically in the spotlight of the science of education, adopting such a position would be based on no substantial knowledge of the matter and therefore can be considered as prejudiced. This is not, however, to say that the conceptualist view would be a formally accepted or endorsed stand among educational scholars; rather, it can be held as the articulated interpretation of their current attitude on universals.
From the point of view of science, the scholars who are truly in pursuit of the science of education have certainly no reason to fear nor, perhaps, a right to ignore the possibility of exploring educational universals with a realist scientific method. If, after a dispassionate and longstanding exploration of this theme by a large number of scholars, educational universals can be shown to be relevant to human existence, a new door would have opened for the development of education and the understanding of human reality; then the science of education would need to place them in the focus of its interest. In any case, the first task is to establish the relevance of the scientific exploration of educational universals.
2.2.1. General Characteristics of the Concept of Evolution
The concept of evolution will be discussed in more detail later in Sections 3.2.5. and 3.3.2. For the purposes of this section, a brief discussion of some characteristics of evolution must suffice.
According to H. E. Barnes (1963, pp. 331-332), the hypothesis of evolution is the foremost of the various intellectual and scientific influences, which have revolutionized the perspective, orientation, and ideals of historical writing. As a general concept, the evolutionary hypothesis merely insists that all portions of the known cosmos, great or small, have been produced by naturalistic causes that bring about both progress and regression. It also implies, in agreement with the ancient hypothesis of Heraclitus, that change is the great basic principle of the cosmos. This notion, however, is somewhat vague and lacks conceptual tools.
Philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright (1988) sees the roots of evolutionary thinking in the awakening of a sense of historicism during the nineteenth century, rather than in the biological innovations of that period. This signified that history was no longer seen as the mere flow of change through the random occurrence of isolated events, but as a process of development carried forward by the causal and oriented occurrence of interrelated phases. This development is characterized by diversification, complexification, and specialization -- in short, sophistication. The concept of development can be seen to refer to all forms of evolution.
There is also the notion of progress, which according to von Wright, relates to the human perception of advancement and is, thus, a values-based concept and is, therefore, a quality that cannot be determined by scientific means. Von Wright's reasoning is that the measure of advancement or progress of a system at a point of time compared to an earlier period is dependent upon the goals that have been set which, in turn, are a subjective choice. While the subjectivity of goal and value choices can be argued (see: P. Izadi 1994; see also hypotheses H8 in Section 3.4.2.), it can be maintained that, when speaking of evolution as a universal phenomenon, it is useful to differentiate between the concepts of change, development and progress (see: Mannermaa 1991, pp. 233-235). We shall return to this issue later (see principles S3a, S5, and S5a in Section 3.2.5.).
2.2.2. The Nature and Process of Biological Evolution
As generally known, it was Charles Darwin who in 1859 set forth the structure of his theory of evolution in his groundbreaking work, Origin of Species (Darwin 1981a [1859]). Later he supplemented and elaborated this work in many books, including The Descent of Man (Darwin 1981b [1871]). According to Darwin, the process of biological evolution is characterized by genetic differentiation, natural selection and biological diversification (see also Section 3.2.6.).
Before biological evolution actually began, a certain process of inorganic evolution diversified the available substances and prepared the chemical foundation for the emergence of biological evolution. Moreover, biological evolution itself can be viewed from the point of view of monocellular evolution, plant evolution and animal evolution. Here we will briefly examine these various levels of evolution from the point of view of our purpose. (See: Avers 1989; Bendall 1983; Birx 1984; Calow 1983; Fortey 1999; Grant 1985.)
The inorganic nature displays no trace of consciousness and its elements merely exist and interact according to fundamental physical laws. This is the most basic and most primitive level of contingent existence. Basic biological systems (such as monocellular life and plants) demonstrate more goal-oriented existence, endued with the power of growth and guided by both a genetic program as well as environmental conditions; these living systems, however, have no assessable capacity for consciousness. They constitute the first level of organic existence. Within the organic realm, it is animals that show clear signs of awareness or consciousness; they exhibit in varying intensities, depending upon their degree of capacity, the ability to perceive their environment through senses and react to its stimuli through movement, activity, and even emotions. This is the first level of conscious existence. Of course, any one of these levels of existence precludes, by definition, the ones preceding it.
Now, it is estimated that the Earth formed into a planet about 4'600 million years ago. The stirring of biological evolution, towards the end of the first billion years, was in the emergence of organic compounds within the chemical activity of inanimate matter. Then, after the lapse of 3'150 million years after the formation of the planet, monocellular systems began diversifying and primitive forms of vegetation evolved; this means that inanimate systems, the first level of contingent existence, were the ruling form of existence during the first 68 % of the Earth's life (early Precambrian, and the Archaeozoic era in Precambrian). It took another 770 million years before the first primitive multicelled animals emerged; in other words plants, the first level of organic existence, were the highest level of evolutionary order for 17 % of the existence of the Earth (the Proterozoic era in Precambrian). The animal kingdom, the first level of conscious existence, emerged as the most advance level of existence on earth and remained so until almost the present, i.e. some 15 % of the geological history (the late Precambrian, the Paleozoic and Mesozoic eras, and the Tertiary period of the Cenozoic era).
While it is clear that the concept of change is the characteristic quality of biological evolution, it is reasonable to maintain that it is also distinguished by the quality of development. Differentiation is still mere change, but natural selection leads, provably, to biological diversification, complexification, and specialization (i.e. sophistication). This means that the majority of species on this planet today are more diverse, complex and specialized than those that lived, say, 800 million years ago. This fits within our definition of 'development'. As to progress, since it relates to the human perception of advancement, it is not identified here with biological evolution.
2.2.3. Differences between Biological and Social Evolution
What, then, is the difference between biological and social evolution. Great care must be taken to make a difference between the notions of social evolution vs. social Darwinism. The former indicates a general notion that social reality undergoes evolutionary processes, while the latter is an assertion that social growth and change takes place in terms of a struggle in which only the fittest (strongest) socio-cultural elements can survive. The predecessor of social Darwinsim can be found in political realism which essentially reduces to the political-ethical principle that "might is right". The theory has a long history and it was expanded by Machiavelli and others, such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau. It underwent a new incarnation in the form of social Darwinism in the late nineteenth century. (Moseley 2001; see also: Bannister 1979; Helm 1999.)
Our point of view, however, far from endorsing social Darwinism, makes a clear difference between biological and social evolution. Why differentiate between biological and social evolution, thus indicating a differentiation between humans and animals? Biologically, there is no point in separating human beings from the rest of the animal kingdom: there are no biological evolutionary leaps significant enough to separate man as a distinct life form from animals (such as the distinction between plants and animals). But when we focus on social evolution our attention is drawn to the sense of community and thus to the concept of consciousness. It is here that an evolutionary leap from animal to human does appear to have taken place.
So, let us view social evolution, first, from the point of view of the evolution of consciousness. In Section 2.2.2., it was noted that animals, as apart from lower biological entities, show clear signs of awareness -- the ability to perceive their environment and react to its stimuli by movements. The human evolution of consciousness refers to the time of human influence on earth. This period (the Quaternary period of the Cenozoic era, especially its Pleistocene and Holocene epochs) comprises only a few million years, i.e. a mere 0.1 % of the Earth's life.
It is possible to detect equally significant differences between human consciousness and animal awareness, as there are between animal awareness and plant non-awareness (see: P. Izadi 1994). Animals are aware, through their senses, of their surroundings and are able to react, through their instincts, to these stimuli. This can be called instinctive consciousness and results in what we call "animal behaviour". Human beings, arguably, possess two additional (and fundamentally different) forms of consciousness:
Consciousness of ego or rational consciousness: awareness of self, that not only the environment exists but "I" exists in that environment, an awareness of one's relationship with the surrounding reality, a capacity for rational thought and the volition to act deliberately, capable of applying latent talents through rational activity.
Consciousness of potential or ideal consciousness: consciousness and innate awareness of the possibility for progress and ascendance, of a purpose and of some truth or reality greater than ones ego, the conception of ethical right vs. wrong, commitment to high principles and ideals.
These describe the evolutionary level of what one might call meta-conscious systems -- systems that are conscious of their potential. There is no indication that animals would possess and exhibit such consciousness and here we will be staisfied with the position that the human reality is the only known evolutionary system that can exhibit meta-consciousness.
The first manifestations of meta-consciousness in human beings may have been little more than momentary breaks from the routines of 'survivalist groups of intelligent animals'. But it seems that in meta-conscious systems external stimuli, instead of starting a mechanism of organic reactions, start a process of conscious, or more often subconscious, choice which, in the last analysis, is essentially a choice between instinctive consciousness and ideal consciousness -- i.e. the choice between instinctive drives and immediate needs, on the one hand, and ideal goals and principles, on the other. It is a value position humans are called to take even in their smallest everyday issues.
Why does it seem, then, that it is so much easier for us humans to opt for (or to be inclined towards) the instinctive behaviour -- a behaviour that, combined with human intelligence, has often proved devastating to the purpose of attaining to the potential of the system? A considerable stretch of our time perspective seems necessary here: considering the relative shortness of the period when meta-conscious systems have functioned on the Earth (some 0.1 % of its whole life), it is reasonable to maintain that this evolutionary level of consciousness is a mere child. Therefore, it has been only natural that meta-consciousness has been weak and undeveloped and it has easily fallen prey to the long-established and straightforward instinctive consciousness.
While many animal species evince clear signs of social life and organization, there is little evidence to support the idea that such social organization would be the result of conscious innovation and the expression of collective will and effort. Indeed, the abovementioned meta-consciousness seems to be the factor that makes a difference between human society and animal sociability. It involves individual and collective choices as well as social inventions. It is here that von Wright's (1988) notion of evolutionary progress (as apart from change and development) emerges, with accompanying "human perception of advancement" as a values-based concept.
his offers an alternative evolutionary interpretation of human history. It acknowledges that humankind, as a function of its meta-consciousness, has an innovative aspiration for a sense of community, of collective achievement and of social coherence and organization. Thus, human beings have evolved through initial stages of self-sufficiency and independence, inevitably towards increasing interdependence with an expanding range of organization and more complex forms of cooperation. Despite the bloodstained history of humankind and ongoing territorial wars and disputes, representing momentary drawbacks and breakdowns, this process has unfailingly advanced throughout history.
This idea is, of course, no newcomer to the interpretation of social evolution. It resonates with the Aristotelian idea of the emergence of civic communities. Although it may, at first, seem empirically unfounded, yet the observable and verifiable overall process and outcome of social evolution proves in its favour (see: P. Izadi 1991 & 1994): in the beginning of known human history, there were scarcely larger sustainable groups than family clans; these gradually emerged into tribal societies; later, through long periods of commotions and strife, the tribal life found its next stage in the formation of the city-state; and only relatively recently, after a bloody history of invasions and imperial rule, has the concept of sovereign nation-states established itself as the most advanced level of organizing human societies (cf. principles S3a and S5 in Section 3.2.5.).
It is in addressing this unifying aspect of subtle integration that most theories of history appear to fail. As Calhoun (1992, p. 232) puts it: "Neither Marx's theory of capitalism nor any theory of industrial society (or postindustrial society) offers an adequate account of society itself, that is, social integration."
There is no reason to assume that the process will end here. Indeed, today -- having exhausted the possibilities of state sovereignty to answer the evolutionary needs of humankind -- we seem to be going through a period of unprecedented chaotic upheavals and global challenges, and arriving at the stirrings of a world society (cf.: Moskowitz 1968, p. 71; Commission on Global Governance 1995). It is also noteworthy that at no point, during the evolutionary process, did the preliminary stages of social organization dissolve as new ones unfolded. On the contrary, the older forms of society became permanent and integral components of these new ones. Thus, even today, the basic social structure of family clans, tribes and city-states are not extinct or even scarce: family clans have transmuted into the nuclear family as the basic unit of society, tribal life has been established in the form of villages that are the heart of the rural areas of a nation, and city-states have of course transformed into cities that form the cultural and socio-political focal points of a nation -- the existence and maintenance of the nation-state is, indeed, completely dependent upon these lower levels of organization.
Would it, then, be unreasonable to conclude that the independent history of tribes, peoples and nations has been completed and effectively reached its conclusion; that we are now witnessing the beginning of the history of humankind as a single society. We are at the first global turning point in the process of civilizational evolution (cf.: King & Schneider 1991; Laszlo 1989, pp. 122-124; Mesarovic & Pestel 1974; Toffler 1974; P. Russell 1983, p. 55).
Thus, based on our assumption of meta-consciousness, it is characteristic to human nature to have a civilizing aspiration (both individually and collectively): a desire to develop and ascend to higher levels of physical, mental, social, and spiritual accomplishment. In critical points along humanity's evolution, meta-consciousness has been fed by new visions of the future, which in turn has significantly amplified this civilizing aspiration. As mentioned in Section 2.1.4., the most influential source of future visions has been world religions, which, at the time of their appearance, were the progressive force of society (although they later became corrupted through the misuse of clerical authority).
Our notion of social evolution bears, therefore, little resemblance to social Darwinism in that -- in addition to the mechanisms of differentiation, natural selection, and diversification -- it involves the influence of human meta-consciousness. In biological evolution, every next generation of a species learns the same general skills and behaviour as the previous generations (within the limits of certain instinctive adjustments), unless there are genetic mutations and adaptations that dictate otherwise. Due to the profound influence of meta-consciousness, however, every next generation of human beings learns, along with the accumulated learning of previous generations, additional different things (regardless of any genetic changes or lack thereof) -- i.e. every new generation of human beings also learns completely new things unknown to its ancestors. This is the essential quality at the core of social evolution making it fundamentally different from biological evolution.
2.3.1. Stochastic Education vs. Systematic Education
The division of education into formal and informal education is a generally accepted notion. Since, however, our definition of education here is rather generic and inclusive, also our notion of stochastic vs. systematic is somewhat broader than formal vs. informal.
By "stochastic education", we mean the multitudinous (and mostly uncontrolled) input that bears influence on human beings and on how they grow into members of a society. This includes, for instance, the interaction and encounters between the various elements of humanity (individuals, groups, even nations) and the influence they bear on each other. Such stochastic education may also include influences that are out of the scope of human control (such as natural catastrophes that can alter the structure and mentality of entire cultures). Such interactions and influences do 'educate' individuals, groups and nations to one direction or another but their effects and outcome are, mostly, unpredictable and, thus, stochastic.
By "systematic education", on the other hand, is meant those social influences that form a more-or-less coherent paradigm and are practised by various protagonists of educational purposes (such as institutionalized systems of formal education, political propaganda, the voice of intelligentsia and academic elite, the input of the media, the learning of traditional norms and customs etc.). For instance, any national school system is meant to promote the well-being of that nation and its government and is, usually, in congruence with the traditions and highest norms of that nation. In addition, the media and academic opinion-makers practice an orientated educational influence. While they may not always agree, these influences and their dialogue have a noticeable 'educational' effect in that they push the various elements of society towards certain goals and are meant to promote specific agendas and are, thus, systematic.
One could object that home education was not mentioned in either of the types. This is merely due to the fact that home education is the first and most profound educational context human beings encounter. Its influence constitutes both stochastic and systematic education and, therefore, it cannot be attributed clearly to either of the types. Moreover, the contents and form of home education differ highly from culture to culture and, thus, the emphasis on its stochastic or systematic aspects is not meaningfully defined.
2.3.2. The Historical Attainability of Educational Goals
We have briefly defined the character of stochastic and systematic education. However, whether or not education attains its professed goals is an entirely different question. The attainability of educational goals is a problematic issue for social and educational theory.
With stochastic education, it is easier to define the 'goals' because, by definition, they can be ascertained only in retrospect. In fact, since stochastic education has no professed goals, its 'goals' are the outcome of the stochastic process and can be observed as they emerge. For instance, one of the most notable stochastic learning processes of humankind has been that of governance and social order -- that is, the process of learning to manage the human society in a meaningful and sustainable manner. This learning process is an outcome of the experiences of humanity through its history. It is seen in the development of human organization from tribes to city-states and nation-states, as described in Section 2.2.3. This process accelerated considerably during the past century when, in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was finally found possible to begin consolidating the foundations of world order and look for possibilities of global governance, culminating in the establishment of the United Nations -- a system which, while certainly inadequate in relation to its final ideals, was now endowed with powers that were absent in the short-lived and lame League of Nations. This is an example of the historical attainability of stochastic educational 'goals'. It indicates that there are historically valid aspirations that will eventually be attained, even if no human agency is systematically pursuing them.
In terms of systematic educational goals, however, there seem to be historical evidence of both their attainability and unattainability. Many systems of education proved, in the course of history, effective and attained their objectives, while many others failed either at the outset or after a long period of tenacious persistence. What might be the reasons for this inconsistency? Is it a mere random outcome of historical occurrences, or is there some more coherent possible explanation behind this? We shall now examine three historical cases of systematic education and seek to understand the reasons for their outcomes.
2.3.3. Historical Educational Case 1: Education for Nazi Domination
The Nazi regime of the Third Reich and the attempt of National Socialism on educational domination provide a good historical case of systematic education -- for, indeed, systematic it was. Let us review, briefly, some of the features of this educational attempt (see: Beyerchen 1977; Bracher 1973; Grunberger 1974; Hirsch 1988).
The Nazi policy towards education was the straightforward 'nazification' of education; it had a direct influence on the devaluation of objective learning and ushered in an era of anti-intellectualism. For Nazis, the main educational concern was its utility: they considered education as useful and worthy of support, as long as it provided a means to their intended ends. Thus, the highest priority was given to the formation of good, strong physical bodies, followed by character development within a National Socialist framework. As the Nazi 'education reform' proceeded, one of the major objectives became that of gathering the youth under the service of National Socialism. The youth policy involved the assimilation of young people as thoroughly as possible into the Hitler Jugend and then into the Labour Service and the Armed Forces.
Nazi education, starting from early age all the way to adulthood, was based on an extreme racist ideology and on militaristic norms of behaviour. This involved the creation of new reading materials for various age groups. For instance, the 9-12 year olds were no longer allowed to read fairy tales or animal stories; instead, they read about the World War and the Hitler Jugend. The literature read by the young increasingly glorified war and lead them to believe that war is a normal feature of human behaviour, that the use of force was 'legitimate' for the pursuit of survivalist and expansionist ends. The overall effect was dramatic on educational standards. They were reduced to the very basics. The factors that lead to this include the diminishing of the educational opportunities for girls, the increasing shortage of trained teachers, and the replacement of scientific and objective knowledge with coloured political views.
The indoctrination of teachers was systematic and swift. By 1938, the majority of the teaching force had undergone compulsory 'in-service' or 'updating' training. School subjects were rewritten and reordered. Hitler stressed repeatedly that the primary task of education was the instilling of racial consciousness in the heart of every student.
Sports became the crown of all subjects, boxing becoming compulsory in upper school. Biology, history, and the German language became emphasized as tools for 'nazification'. Biology was harnessed to focus on the differences of race, on heredity and on the importance of the "survival of the fittest". History, too, was rewritten to manifest the ascendancy of the 'strong' and the naturalness that the 'weak must perish'. Even mathematics was utilized for Nazi indoctrination by focussing on mathematical problems and calculations that were related to artillery trajectories, fighter-to-bomber ratios etc.
In the Nazi system, perhaps girls suffered the greatest educational loss. Those girls who were in higher schools were redirected into the fields of domestic science or language. In 1934, a law became effective limiting the number of female acceptance for universities to 10 % of the entire student intake. Competition was so intense that sixth formers were prepared to denounce their classmates to the Gestapo. Of the thirty-nine National Political Educational Establishments (the educational system created for training the future Nazi elite) only two were provided for girls.
In addition to the 'reform' taking place within the education system, the mentioned National Political Educational Establishments functioned as a separate elite school to enable the Party to penetrate the existing system. In all respects, the regime functioned with two purposes: to penetrate and undermine the old system, on the one hand, and to raise new replacing systems, on the other. This is seen, for instance, in the coexistence of the Army and the SS, as well as in the dual judiciary system.
The overall educational landscape of the Third Reich was underscored by a notable decline in educational standards. So tangible was the effect that even the German Army had to admit the low standard of recruits which, according to the Army's own records, was due to the simply "inconceivable lack of elementary knowledge" exhibited by so many of the candidates. The Nazi indoctrination required the visible elimination of the established intellectual life in Germany. Nazis took gradual control over all aspects of education through seemingly indirect means. And they were successful: although most intellectual potential was lost, yet those losing it (the people) were unaware of the loss they were subjected to. The majority of Germans, willingly, gave up their human right of access to objective knowledge.
2.3.4. Historical Educational Case 2: Education for Communist Utopia
Another historical case of systematic education, and one much more longstanding than the Nazi attempt, is that of the Communist ideology, particularly as applied in the Soviet Union during the 70 and some odd years of its existence. If Nazi education was systematic, Soviet education was both systematic and consistent and may, therefore, provide a more convincing case for the study of the influence of systematic education. We will now take an overview of this case (see: Bereday & Pennar 1960; Chapman 1962; Counts 1957; Matthews 1982; Merkuriev 1993; Riordan 1988).
It is quite possible that no other society than the Soviet Union has placed such an unshakable confidence on education and mobilized such enormous resources for its implementation. Soviet education was, in a certain sense, 'messianic' and idealistic. The Soviet policy was based on the belief that man can and must improve society, and that the school has a leading role in this. The Soviet system brought Russia and its dependencies, as well as the rest of the Soviet republics, a long way since 1917 -- a progress that was particularly evident in education. In 1918, the Soviet rulers took over all schools and colleges. They abolished fees and made education compulsory to all 8-15 years old children. Later compulsory education was extended, so that by the 1980s most children attended school from the age 7 to 17. In the 1960s, some 7 % of the Soviet national product went into providing formal education (while the Western countries spent the average of 3-5 %).
Soviet education was highly efficient in teaching basic knowledge. In 1920, the literacy rate was at 44 %. By 1939, it had climbed to 87 %, and by 1970 to 99.7 %. In 1989, 49 % of the population aged over 15 had graduated from secondary or vocational school and 11 % had finished some higher education.
The nine-year common curriculum emphasized language and literature, mathematics, military and physical training, as well as history, manual skills and natural sciences. There were special schools focussed on foreign languages, music, ballet, or art; these schools were for the gifted or the children of the privileged segments of society with good political connections. Moreover, all were encouraged to join youth organizations (such as the Young Octobrists for 6-9 year olds, the Pioneers for 10-15 year olds, and the Komsomol for the 14-28 year olds. The Soviet Union also screened schoolchildren for athletic and other talents.
During its best periods, the Soviet Union earned clear political loyalty among young people and some of this is certainly attributable to school education. But the Soviet system asked for more than just a vague loyalty; it required a firm Marxist-Leninist world-view and a committed participation in the building of Communism at the various levels of society. There was political training particularly designed to teach these virtues to the youth and was systematically pursued in schools and universities. This training mainly included compulsory lecture courses on Party history, historical materialism, and economics. Such courses, however, were often met by large-scale indifference on the part of the students. For the Communist Party, lack of commitment by young people to political ideals was regarded as an ongoing challenge to improve their system of educational indoctrination.
While the results of educational indoctrination are hard to measure, young people in the Soviet Union were certainly not a sheepish and undifferentiated mass that would speak with a single voice. Especially many of the better educated showed a firm capacity of critical thinking combined with profound general knowledge of philosophy, history, the sciences, literature, and the like. Many of them were also critical of the Soviet society. Yet, the fact remains that their knowledge and understanding were thoroughly influenced or 'tinted' by the indoctrinating grip of the educational system. Moreover, many students felt grateful, and rightly so, to a machinery that provided educational and working opportunities vastly superior to those available to their parents and grandparents. The combination of that indoctrination and this gratitude did conspire to encourage the youth, on the one hand, to surrender their intellectual independence to the official political doctrine and, on the other, to adapt themselves and their needs to the conditions of a peculiar socio-political structure. These resulted in two extremes: a civilized and highly informed mentality with a compatible ability of theorizing and analysis, at one extreme, and the opportunistic pursuit of personal gain, at the other.
There were also other, more tangible, problem issues within the Soviet educational system. First, the ongoing expansion and establishment of new educational institutions resulted in circumstances where students ended up graduating with skills below the average (this was particularly true of teacher training). Second, it soon became evident that the curricula and teaching methods that were used often supported archaic modes of thinking and irrelevant formal knowledge leading to unimaginative, routine-minded qualities in the students. Both of these factors resulted, of course, in a steady decline of educational quality. The typical professional expertise acquired was narrow in scope and was out of synchrony with the needs of the labour market. Another set of problems relates to the role that the State took in almost replacing the family. Social problems swelled as Soviet children began to grow up in an atmosphere of mistrust, suspicion, and segregation. A whole other set of issues arose from the efforts to assimilate the non-Russian peoples within the Soviet reign, particularly through education (but also through linguistic integration, migration, and intermarriage). Opposition -- first indirect, but later increasingly open -- against this trait was one of the contributing factors to the dissolving of the Soviet Union.
Yet, the appeal of the Communist world-view was deeply rooted in many segments of the society. Contrary to popular thinking, education in the Soviet Union had a broader basis than merely aiming at the continuance of the power of a small elite of political rulers. It was to be the instrument of creating a new type of citizen that could be the basic unit of a new social order. It is here that the appeal of the Communist ideology stood (and, for some, still stands) and it is also here that it failed.
2.3.5. Historical Educational Case 3: Education for National Citizenship
Our third historical case of systematic education is that of the steady emergence, since the nineteenth century, of nationalized systems of education. Whilst such systems are particular to no individual nation-state and are, indeed, generic to all modern nation-states, their emergence heralded a distinct and new form of institutionalized education. In fact, the Nazi and Soviet educational systems, discussed earlier, are specific forms of nationalized systems of education, and they would not have been possible without this context. We will now, briefly, discuss the general features of this phenomenon (see: Coombs 1985; Johansson 1985; Kangaslahti 1984; M. Mitchell 1990 [1931]; Posch 1990; Smolics 1981; Suutarinen 2000).
As mentioned earlier, nationalized systems of education emerged with the aim of ensuring the stability and security of society and of promoting the well-being of the nation and its government. The objectives and aims of such a system of education are, usually, in congruence with the best traditions and highest norms of the nation. These objectives can be summed up in the aspiration of fostering "national citizenship" -- of educating "a model citizen of the nation".
The fact that such nationalized systems evolved at all may be descriptive of a growing awareness, during the nineteenth century, that a nation cannot be successful unless its citizens are educated. This national orientation has become so characteristic to our systems of formal education that most of us, today, view the nation-state and the entire national educational systems as the largest 'natural' units of society and of formal education. The nation-state has become our primary frame of reference.
Of course, it is true that social and pedagogical policies are systematically devised and administered nationally, that nations provide the authoritative mechanisms of decision-making and change, and that our lives are set within the context of national allegiances. On the other hand, it is also true that, in an increasingly interdependent world, national allegiances and arrangements, alone, are insufficient in their ability to provide for human education and social capacity. This limitation was already perceived by Émile Durkheim (1925 & 1973) who, while never believing in the practical possibility of a global human society, was aware of the limitation of a purely nationalistic approach to society and education. Marion Mitchell (1990 [1931], pp. 87-106) explains: "Durkheim believed that ... the human objective was in its turn far superior to the national. But there did not exist any real society of humanity, with its own organization, its own conscience --, in a word its own individuality. The national state was the most highly organized human group that existed. ... he scarcely expected that there would ever be constituted one [state] which comprised all humanity." Today, the effect of internationalization and globalization are strongly felt by all national systems of education.
"Broadly perceived, this intercourse [in educational and cultural affairs] constitutes a worldwide 'common market' for educational, intellectual and cultural goods and ideas that flow daily across national boundaries through books, newspapers, and magazines, by means of the revolutionary new electronic communications media and by way of performing artists, concert groups, and exhibitions. It also includes the vastly increased number of students studying abroad; foreign experts and advisers working in developing countries; the literally hundreds of international professional meetings held annually throughout the world; and the untold number of dialogues and exchanges that go on informally and incessantly between scholarly, scientific, and artistic colleagues in different parts of the world through letters, reports, and personal encounters." (Coombs 1985, p. 286.)
Still, the established traditions of formal education remain within the basic limits of national interests, although international education may be part of the curriculum. J. Kangaslahti (1984, p. 23) expands on this issue: "Any nation's view of the world, cultures and people has never been universally shared. Today, education has dimensions other than to prepare citizens of a community and a country for participation in national activities. People have many modes of interaction across cultural and national boundaries. There are no ways that local or national authorities can control all that will be taught to their citizens." To put it simply, this means that, today, nation-states are bound by conditions beyond their own control, and therefore, national systems of education, while never having been exclusive reflections of their particular culture, are today so to an even lesser degree.
In addition to the demands of interculturalism and internationalism, the process of change has also placed new socioeconomic requirements on education (see: Posch 1990, p. 5). Still a few decades ago, vocational structures and demands were rather static; the structure of the educational system was then an adequate institutional answer to social needs. For instance, dynamic qualities and anticipatory thinking were not a necessary condition (except for top management). Now, however, static qualities (such as discipline, punctuality, and the like) are no longer sufficient; additional dynamic qualities are needed. This has become a clear challenge to our national systems of education, particularly in the case of vocational education.
Another example of the challenges of national education is the increase of multiculturalism within the national boundaries of a country. In a multicultural society, the national government is expected to provide specific educational support for ethnic groups within the society. It is generally accepted that the retention and strengthening of ethnic identity accompanied by the denial of the means for its cultural expression, represents a potential threat to social cohesion. (Smolics 1981, p. 30.)
2.3.6. Systematic Education as a Future-Orienting Mechanism
The foregoing discussion of the three historical cases of systematic education has shown that different educational objectives can be historically more or less attainable. Some cases end up in collapse and others thrive over long periods of history. Why might this be? Why did the Nazi system of education collapse before it even properly got underway? What of the Soviet educational system, which after prevailing for some seven decades, rapidly started to deteriorate? And why have the nationalized systems of education, despite their crises and needs of change, not undergone the same breakdown?
One could argue that the collapse of the Nazi and Soviet educational system was not due to the unsustainablity of their systems of education, but that other reasons (such as historical events and coincidences) caused the collapse of the entire socio-political system of these regimes and, with them, their educational systems. This argument is true in that the collapse of the system of education is not an independent event and is closely linked with the entire society it represents. However, that mere historical coincidence would be the cause of the breakdown is not convincing. Something in the very nature of these regimes made them unstable and, in the long run, unsustainable. Moreover, their educational systems were at the very core of their functioning: whatever these regimes based their systems of education on, the same was also at the foundation of their socio-political systems. Therefore, it can be counter-argued that it was the very character of the doctrines and ideologies, at the core of both the educational system and the socio-political regime, that were unsustainable and, therefore, could not stand the evolutionary force of history.
It is also useful to make a differentiation between the long-term consequences of the Nazi and Soviet systems of education. Both were, of course, systems of indoctrination and sought propagandist 'brainwashing'. However, they did have a different general influence. The Nazi goal was the creation of a new human race -- a humanly exclusive goal (possible for a small segment of humanity); the Soviet goal was the creation of a new type of citizen -- a humanly inclusive goal (potentially possible for all human beings). Moreover, as shown in Sections 2.3.3. and 2.3.4., the Nazi method caused a significant decline in the standard of education of the entire nation, while the Soviet approach increased the standard of education of the populace.
To sum up, one could say that the Nazi system was based on worshipping an individual and a race, and for all humane reasons, that system can be designated as 'evil'. It should also be borne in mind that, while the Nazi system appears idealistic, its broadest context is, in fact, quite cynical in that its does not view humanity in an inclusive and optimistic manner; rather, it has a highly exclusive and pessimistic view of humanity as a whole. Soviet system, on the other hand, was founded on revering a particular dogma and, while not inherently 'evil', implicated assumptions that were incompatible with reality, and thus for all practical reasons, it can be seem to have proven itself as 'erroneous'. The aforementioned alleged idealism vs. actual cynicism also holds true in the case of the Soviet system, albeit not in such a flagrant manner. As to the nationalized systems of education, they appear to have a sound historical justification and are, generally, neither 'evil' nor 'erroneous' but, since they easily fall into a nationalistic idealization of a single nation, they are often insufficient to meet the demands of a changing world and can, therefore, be viewed as 'limited'.
It is apparent, however, that while the Nazi and Soviet systems of education collapsed rapidly (in an historical frame of time), the nationalized systems of education are not actually collapsing or being eradicated at all -- they are simply evolving further. Their original emergence was not motivated by whimsical ultranationalism nor based on an ideological fixation; rather, it was grounded on a genuine and gradual awakening of a sense of national identity. Indeed, as pointed out in Section 1.4., historical figures who harnessed the proactive power of education to effect prospective transformations in the fabric of society did so with the conviction that their idealistic goals were visionary steps in a civilizational process -- i.e. that such steps were not the final destiny of the nation but progressive advances in an ongoing evolution. Therefore, it seems that the challenges that nationalized systems of education are facing today are not signs their defectiveness but rather an indication of further evolutionary needs of human society. In fact, it seems that nationalized systems of education were a successful historical case of systematic education: they achieved their goal of fostering "national citizenship" -- a sustainable achievement that can be built upon and only needs to adapt and expand itself according to the dictates of historical change.
Moreover, national systems of education have exhibited the ability to adapt themselves. The twentieth century witnessed an accelerating extension of education to the masses. National and local governments have been gradually more willing to allocate resources to this field, and national societies have shown an ability to mobilize and train armies of professionally qualified teachers. All this has been amplified by the series of development plans focussed on educational needs and massively financed by the World Bank, government agencies, major foundations, and several branches of the United Nations system, as well as by other such bodies. Moreover, the information technology explosion has made all citizens of the Earth potential (though not yet actual) beneficiaries of the accumulated learning of the entire human race.
Perhaps, we can summerize by stating that educational objectives that are in congruence with the conditions of reality -- with social and individual human potentialities -- are sustainable, and those that are in contradiction with these conditions will finally collapse or gradually vanish with the course of history. In other words, only such systematic education that complies with these requirements is ultimately capable of functioning as a future-orienting mechanism.